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IN SEARCH OF THE RIGHT BALANCE: 
PATCO LAYS THE FOUNDATION FOR 
ANALYZING THE COMMERCIAL 
REASONABLENESS OF SECURITY 
PROCEDURES UNDER UCC ARTICLE 4A 
Abstract: On July 3, 2012, in Patco Construction Co. v. People’s United Bank, 
the First Circuit held that security procedures used to verify electronic 
funds transfers initiated through online banking were commercially un-
reasonable. In reaching its decision, the court laid a strong foundation 
for analyzing commercial reasonableness in future cases. This Comment 
argues that future courts should build on this analysis by considering re-
cent merger activity when determining the standard against which com-
mercial reasonableness should be measured. 
Introduction 
 Online banking systems have enjoyed growing and widespread 
popularity in recent years.1 This is partly because of the ease with which 
Automated Clearinghouse (“ACH”) payments can be made online.2 
ACH is an electronic method of funds transfer by which customers 
submit payment information to their bank through a secure online 
portal, funds from all submitted payments are collected and sorted ac-
cording to their destination bank, and then the originating bank sends 
the funds to the destination banks in batches along with the payment 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Jim Bruene, Online Banking and Marketing Statistics from Net.Finance, NetBanker 
(Apr. 20, 2007, 4:24 PM), http://www.netbanker.com/2007/04/online_banking_marketing_ 
statistics_from_net_finance_conference.html (noting that one regional bank had “150,000 
very active small-business online banking users,” and that business customers there were 
“making $45 million in payments per month with the bank’s DirectPay service” (internal 
quotations omitted)); Susannah Fox & Jean Beier, Online Banking 2006: Surfing to the Bank, 
Pew Internet & Am. Life Project 1–2 ( June 14, 2006), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/ 
media//Files/Reports/2006/PIP_Online_Banking_2006.pdf.pdf (describing online banking 
as a “mainstream internet activity” and noting that, as of 2005, “43% of internet users, or 
about 63 million American adults, bank online,” up from 13% in 1998). 
2 See Intro to the ACH Network, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/Intro2ACH (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2013). ACH provides greater efficiency in funds transfers than alternative wire 
transfer services. See Peter J. Mucklestone, The Journey of a Check, 2006 Prof. Law. 39, 43–
45; Intro to the ACH Network, supra. ACH transactions have become enormously popular in 
the last three decades, with the number of ACH payments made in 2010 exceeding nine-
teen billion. See History, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/aboutus_History (last visited Apr. 
20, 2013); Intro to the ACH Network, supra. 
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information.3 The receiving banks then use the payment information 
to distribute the funds to their customers.4 In 2011, more than $20.2 
billion in payments were made via ACH, and volume increased in each 
quarter of 2012.5 
 But electronic bank fraud has risen in stride with the number of 
ACH payments initiated online.6 Indeed, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Company (FDIC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have 
both issued special alerts warning banks and small business owners 
about the rise in these types of Internet crimes.7 In the third quarter of 
2009 alone, fraud involving electronic funds transfers from business 
accounts resulted in more than $120 million in losses.8 
 The allocation of losses from fraudulent transfers is governed by 
Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).9 Generally, a bank 
is not liable for losses if it followed commercially reasonable security 
procedures to verify the transaction.10 But only four cases have consid-
ered what constitutes commercially reasonable online banking security 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Intro to the ACH Network, supra note 2; see also Patco Constr. Co. v. People’s United 
Bank, 684 F.3d 197, 200 (1st Cir. 2012) (discussing the parties’ agreement relating to ACH 
payments submitted online). 
4 Intro to the ACH Network, supra note 2. This is a more cost-effective method of payment 
than wire transfers because ACH sends multiple transactions from multiple customers 
each time a batch is run, whereas a wire transfer represents only one customer’s transac-
tion and is sent one at a time as each request is received. See id. Because of the lag time 
between entry and batch release, ACH is most commonly used for recurring payments like 
payroll, whereas wire transfer services are more frequently used for transactions such as 
investments or capital distributions, where a quick turnaround time is at more of a premi-
um. See id. 
5 ACH Network Statistics, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/ACHntwkstats (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2013). 
6 See Robert W. Ludwig, Jr., et al., Malware and Fraudulent Electronic Funds Transfers: Who 
Bears the Loss?, 16 Fidelity L.J. 101, 101 (2010). 
7 See id. at 102–03. 
8 Id. at 101–02. 
9 U.C.C. § 4A-102 (1989). 
10 See id. § 4A-202. The bank also must have accepted the payment order in good faith 
and complied with the security procedures to escape from liability. Id. A security procedure 
is 
a procedure established by agreement of a customer and a receiving bank for 
the purpose of (i) verifying that a payment order or communication amending 
or cancelling a payment order is that of the customer, or (ii) detecting error in 
the transmission or the content of the payment order or communication. 
Id. § 4A-201. Commercially reasonable security procedures are important because they 
take the place of traditional verification methods and provide the bank with a reasonable 
basis on which to accept the payment order. See Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, 257 F. Supp. 2d 
632, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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procedures.11 In 2012, in Patco Construction Co. v. People’s United Bank, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed this question, 
holding that the online banking security procedures in place at a 
Maine community bank recently acquired by a larger, regional bank 
were not commercially reasonable as a matter of law.12 Given the in-
creasing popularity of ACH and other online payments and the associ-
ated increases in Internet-based fraud, the standard for commercial 
reasonableness will only become more important in the future.13 
 Part I of this Comment describes the commercial reasonableness 
standard for security procedures set forth by the UCC and examines 
the security procedure at issue in Patco.14 Then, Part II discusses the 
precedent available to the First Circuit when considering Patco and ex-
plains the Patco holding.15 Finally, Part III argues that future courts 
should build upon the First Circuit’s strong foundation by carefully an-
alyzing the particular circumstances of the customer and the bank, es-
pecially in light of the banking industry’s recent history of frequent 
mergers.16 It also offers recommendations that may help banks avoid 
litigating this issue in the future.17 
I. An Introduction to Loss Allocation Under UCC Article 4A 
and Patco Construction Co. v. People’s United Bank 
 Section A of this Part describes the role of commercial reasona-
bleness of security procedures in Article 4A’s loss allocation scheme for 
fraudulent transfers.18 Section B then provides the factual underpin-
nings of the Patco decision, which are necessary to understand the First 
Circuit’s commercial reasonableness analysis.19 
                                                                                                                      
11 See Patco, 684 F.3d at 211; Filho v. Interaudi Bank, No. 03 Civ. 4795(SAS), 2008 WL 
1752693, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008); Regatos, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 646; All Am. Siding & 
Windows, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 367 S.W.3d 490, 500–01 (Tex. App. 2012). Courts should 
expect more cases in this area in the coming years, because ACH’s popularity has been in-
creasing exponentially in recent years. See History, supra note 2 (“ACH payment volume con-
tinues to double every five years.”). The minimal case law in this area is surprising, particular-
ly because Article 4A’s drafters predicted that the commercial reasonableness of security 
procedures was the issue most likely to be litigated under section 202(b). See U.C.C. § 4A-203 
cmt. 4. 
12 Patco, 684 F.3d at 211. 
13 See Ludwig et al., supra note 6, at 102–03; History, supra note 2. 
14 See infra notes 18–48 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 49–81 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 82–101 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 102–103 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 20–28 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 29–48 and accompanying text. 
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A. Introduction to Loss Allocation Under UCC Article 4A 
 Although Article 4A places the risk of loss for fraudulent electronic 
funds transfers on banks, it also offers two ways for banks to redistribute 
all or some of the loss to customers.20 First, the bank could shift the loss 
to its customer by showing that the payment order at issue was submit-
ted to the bank by the customer’s agent.21 Second, the bank could show 
that: (1) the bank and its customer have agreed on a security proce-
dure for verifying transactions; (2) the security procedure is commer-
cially reasonable; and (3) the bank accepted the payment order in 
good faith and verified it according to the security procedure.22 If the 
bank meets this burden, then the liability for the loss passes to the cus-
tomer.23 The customer can only shift the liability back to the bank if the 
customer can prove that the fraudulent order did not result from a 
breach of its own security system.24 Thus, commercial reasonableness is 
the touchstone for the allocation of losses from fraudulent electronic 
funds transactions.25 
 Article 4A then delineates the commercial reasonableness of a se-
curity procedure as a question of law.26 To decide what is commercially 
                                                                                                                      
20 U.C.C. § 4A-202 (1989); id. § 4A-203 cmt. 2. This cannot be varied by agreement, 
except where the bank agrees to accept additional liability, such as if the bank agrees to be 
liable for all losses due to malware-related fraud. See id. § 4A-202(f); see also id. § 1-302 
(2001) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . , the effect of provisions of [the UCC] may be 
varied by agreement.” (second alteration in original)). 
21 See Grabowski v. Bank of Bos., 997 F. Supp. 111, 123 (D. Mass. 1997) (discussing 
agency law’s intersection with Article 4A); U.C.C. § 4A-202(a). 
22 See U.C.C. § 4A-202(b). 
23 See id. 
24 Id. § 4A-203(a)(2)(ii). This is true regardless of how the third party obtained the in-
formation or whether the customer was at fault for the security breach. See id. 
25 See id. § 4A-202(b); id. § 4A-102 cmt; see also Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 4-1102 
cmt. (1991) (adopting U.C.C. § 4A-102). 
26 See U.C.C. § 4A-201. Commercial reasonableness as a matter of law is an aberration 
from the Code’s general emphasis on questions of fact. See, e.g., id. § 1-205 (2001); id. § 2-
205 cmt. (2003). One Article 4A drafter, Frederick H. Miller, explained that because the 
commercial reasonableness of a security procedure was likely to be among the most com-
monly litigated questions under Article 4A, the drafters wanted to establish a firm string of 
case law to guide attorneys and banking professionals. E-mail from Frederick H. Miller, 
Professor Emeritus, Univ. of Okla. Coll. of Law, to author (Sept. 4, 2012) (on file with au-
thor); see U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4; see also id. § 2-302(1) (noting that unconscionability is a 
matter of law); id. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (stating that “[t]his section is intended to allow the court 
to pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or particular clause therein and to 
make a conclusion of law as to its unconscionability”). Indeed, since its enactment, hun-
dreds of cases have addressed UCC unconscionability. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Golart, 538 
A.2d 1017, 1020–21 (Conn. 1998); Emlee Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Waterbury Transmis-
sions, Inc., 626 A.2d 307, 312 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993); Edart Truck Rental Corp. v. B. 
Swirsky & Co., 579 A.2d 133, 137–38 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990). 
2013] Commercial Reasonableness of Online Banking Security Procedures Under Patco 221 
reasonable, Article 4A instructs courts to consider “the wishes of the 
customer expressed to the bank, the circumstances of the customer 
known to the bank, including the size, type, and frequency of payment 
orders normally issued by the customer to the bank, . . . and security 
procedures in general use by customers and receiving banks similarly 
situated.”27 The question for the court is not whether the security pro-
cedure was the best available, but rather whether it was reasonable for 
the particular customer and the particular bank.28 
B. The Security Procedures and Fraudulent Transfers Underlying Patco 
 Pursuant to Article 4A, the First Circuit in Patco had to determine 
whether the security procedures in place at Ocean Bank when the un-
derlying fraud took place were commercially reasonable.29 In that case, 
the plaintiff, Patco Construction Co., brought suit in 2009 against Peo-
ple’s United Bank in Maine Superior Court over fraudulent transfers 
initiated via Patco’s online banking account that totaled $588,851.26.30 
Patco claimed that People’s United Bank, the owner of Ocean Bank, 
was liable under Maine’s enactment of UCC Article 4A and numerous 
common law claims.31 Subsequent investigation of Patco’s computer 
                                                                                                                      
27 U.C.C. § 4A-202(c). 
28 See id. § 4A-203 cmt. 4. If a customer is offered a commercially reasonable security 
procedure, but opts for a lesser security procedure out of cost or convenience considera-
tions, then the security procedure elected by the customer is presumptively reasonable. See 
id.; see also Grabowski, 997 F. Supp. at 120 (determining that a customer did not agree to 
security procedures where the written agreement was “a modification of the baseline loss 
allocation scheme of Article 4A and not an agreement on a security procedure”); Experi-
Metal, Inc. v. Comercia Bank, No. 09-14890, 2010 WL 2720914, at *5–6 (E.D. Mich. July 8, 
2010) (deciding that there was a material question of fact whether the customer agreed to 
security procedures in writing, which would leave losses from fraudulent transfers on the 
customer because the third-party fraudster obtained login credentials from the customer’s 
online banking user through malware); U.C.C. § 4A-202(c) (noting the conditions under 
which a court should deem a security procedure commercially reasonable). 
29 See Patco, 684 F.3d at 211. 
30 Id. at 199–206. Of this amount, $243,406.83 was recovered, leaving a residual loss of 
$345,444.43. See id. at 205. 
31 Id. at 206; see Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 4-1102 cmt. (1991); U.C.C. § 4A-102; see also 
Bob Sanders, Ocean Bank to Take People’s Name, N.H. Bus. Rev. ( July 1, 2010), http://www. 
nhbr.com/businessnews/statenews/784102-257/ocean-bank-to-take-peoples-name.html (stat-
ing that Ocean Bank was acquired by the Chittenden family of banks before being sold to 
People’s United Bank in early 2009). Patco brought common law claims of negligence, 
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and conversion. Patco, 684 
F.3d at 206. For a discussion of the intersection between the UCC and the common law, see 
Regions Bank v. Provident Bank, Inc., 345 F.3d 1267, 1273–76 (11th Cir. 2003); Centre-Point 
Merch. Bank Ltd. v. Am. Express Bank, Ltd., 913 F. Supp. 202, 206–09 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); 
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network revealed a malware program, which was quarantined and de-
leted by a Patco consultant.32Ocean Bank removed the case to the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Maine.33 There, the court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Ocean Bank, and Patco appealed to the 
First Circuit.34 
 Patco’s appeal allowed the First Circuit to consider for the first 
time whether a bank’s security procedures were commercially reasona-
ble.35 To answer this question, the First Circuit examined the security 
procedures employed by Ocean Bank.36 Ocean Bank’s online banking 
platform, NetTeller, used several complex security procedures designed 
to protect customers’ accounts.37 First, each corporate online banking 
client was assigned a unique company ID.38 Next, employees designated 
by the corporate client were assigned a personal user ID and pass-
word.39 Further, each user provided personalized answers for three 
challenge questions.40 The first time that a user logged onto NetTeller 
from a new device, the system asked a challenge question to confirm 
the user’s identity and installed a digital certificate on the device for 
future authentication purposes.41 
 Additionally, NetTeller built a risk profile for each user by tracking 
the user’s online activity.42 Then, it used the profile data to calculate a 
score for each transaction based on any deviation from previous transac-
tions so that more unusual transactions were marked with higher 
                                                                                                                      
Hyung J. Ahn, Note, Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code: Dangers of Departing from a Rule of 
Exclusivity, 85 Va. L. Rev. 183, 196–212 (1999). 
32 Patco, 684 F.3d at 206. In November 2009, the FBI identified small- and medium-
sized businesses holding accounts at local community banks and credit unions as among 
the most common targets of Internet-based fraud using malware, such as the Zbot found 
on Patco’s computer system. See id.; Ludwig et al., supra note 6, at 103. 
33 Patco, 684 F.3d at 206; see Patco Constr. Co. v. People’s United Bank, No. 2:09-cv-503-
DBH, 2011 WL 2174507, at *1 (D. Mass. May 27, 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 684 F.3d 
197 (1st Cir. 2012). 
34 Patco, 684 F.3d at 206; see Patco, 2011 WL 2174507, at *35. 
35 See Patco, 684 F.3d at 207–10. 
36 See id. at 201–02. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 202. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 202–03. Challenge questions help to verify a user’s identity by requiring the 
user to provide specific personal information, such as his or her mother’s maiden name. 
See id. 
41 Patco, 684 F.3d at 202. 
42 Id. This profile considered the location from which the user logged in, what the user 
did while logged in, and the size, type, and frequency of payment orders that the user in-
put. Id. 
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scores.43 NetTeller required the user to answer a challenge question be-
fore allowing high scoring transactions to be processed.44 But although 
the risk-profiling system was in place in 2009 when the fraud underlying 
Patco occurred, Ocean Bank employees were not monitoring those risk 
scores.45 Finally, NetTeller also required users to answer a challenge 
question any time a transaction amount exceeded a preset threshold.46 
In 2008, Ocean Bank set this amount at one dollar, requiring users to 
answer a challenge question for any transaction initiated online.47 After 
considering both Ocean Bank’s security procedures and the available 
security features in use at other banks, the First Circuit concluded that 
Ocean Bank’s security procedure was not commercially reasonable.48 
II. Uncharted Waters: The Patco Court’s Commercial 
Reasonableness Analysis 
 In Patco, the First Circuit provided a much more detailed commer-
cial reasonableness analysis than the three lower courts that had previ-
ously considered the same question.49 The U.S. District Court for the 
                                                                                                                      
43 Id. Lower scores corresponded to a low-risk transaction, whereas higher scores cor-
responded to a high-risk transaction. Id. at 213. 
44 Id. at 202. Challenge questions were prompted whenever a risk score exceeded 750. 
Id. 
45 Id. at 204. Patco’s typical risk score was between 10 and 214. Id. Risk scores for the 
fraudulent transfers ranged from 563 to 790. Id. at 204–05. Had Ocean Bank been actively 
monitoring the risk scores, its agents would have been able to contact clients with high risk 
scores to confirm the ACH file before sending it. See id. 
46 Id. at 203. 
47 Patco, 684 F.3d at 203 Ocean Bank set this low threshold in an attempt to combat 
low-dollar fraud. Id. at 212. It changed the threshold from $100,000 to $1 after confirming 
with its service provider that the change would have no implications for NetTeller’s securi-
ty functionality. See Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 48, Patco, 684 F.3d 197 (2012) (No. 11-
2031), 2012 WL 605503, at *48. Ocean Bank’s purchase of NetTeller included a subscrip-
tion to the eFraud Network, a database of IP addresses and other information about 
known fraudulent transactions at all member banks. Patco, 684 F.3d at 203. There were also 
a number of available security features that Ocean Bank declined to implement, including: 
(1) out-of-band authentication, which would have required a voice, text, or e-mail confir-
mation of each transaction entered; (2) user-selected pictures, meant to combat phishing; 
and (3) the use of tokens, which are physical devices that display a one-time-use code or 
password information that must be input by a user when he or she performs an online 
transaction. Id. at 203–04. 
48 Patco, 684 F.3d at 211. 
49 See Filho v. Interaudi Bank, No. 03 Civ. 4795(SAS), 2008 WL 1752693, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 16, 2008) (holding that a security procedure consisting of a fax order and a logged 
telephone confirmation requiring customers to answer security questions on a recorded 
line was commercially reasonable for wire transfer fraud committed by plaintiff’s business 
associate); Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, 257 F. Supp. 2d 632, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that 
a security procedure consisting of a fax order and the customer’s unlogged callback con-
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Southern District of New York has confronted commercial reasonable-
ness twice, and a Texas Court of Appeals considered it shortly before 
Patco.50 Section A of this Part explores the facts and reasoning of these 
cases.51 Section B then discusses the First Circuit’s approach to analyz-
ing commercial reasonableness.52 
A. Little Precedent Existed to Guide the Patco Court’s Analysis 
 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York de-
cided two of the three previous cases.53 First, in 2003, in Regatos v. North 
Fork Bank, the court evaluated a security procedure consisting of a 
signed order sent to the bank by fax, a confirmatory phone call between 
the customer and a sole bank officer, and a signature comparison be-
tween the faxed order and a specimen signature.54 The court held that 
it was commercially reasonable because the bank employee could rec-
ognize the customer’s voice, having dealt with him repeatedly over the 
course of several years.55 Then, in 2008, in Filho v. Interaudi Bank, the 
same court considered a security procedure consisting of a logged and 
recorded telephone confirmation with the customer, who was required 
to correctly answer security questions before the bank would release the 
funds.56 The court held that the security procedure was commercially 
reasonable because the additional verification provided by the security 
questions made up for the lack of voice recognition.57 
 These two cases highlighted the importance of multifactor authen-
tication.58 In Regatos, commercial reasonableness turned on the bank’s 
use of an out-of-band voice recognition confirmation method.59 In Fil-
                                                                                                                      
firmation to the same bank representative on an unrecorded line was commercially rea-
sonable for wire transfer fraud committed by an unknown party); All Am. Siding & Win-
dows, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 367 S.W.3d 490, 501 (Tex. App. 2012) (holding that a se-
curity procedure consisting of a company ID, user ID, password, and digital certificate was 
commercially reasonable for ACH transactions initiated via an online banking portal). 
50 See Filho, 2008 WL 1752693, at *4; Regatos, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 646; All Am. Siding, 367 
S.W.3d at 501. 
51 See infra notes 53–66 and accompanying text. 
52 See infra notes 67–81 and accompanying text. 
53 See Filho, 2008 WL 1752693, at *4; Regatos, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 646. 
54 Regatos, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 646. 
55 See id. 
56 Id. 
57 See id. 
58 See Filho, 2008 WL 1752693, at *5; Regatos, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 646. 
59 See Regatos, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 646; Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, Authen-
tication in an Internet Banking Environment 3 (2005) [hereinafter FFIEC Guidance], 
available at http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance.pdf. (“Out-of-band generally 
refers to additional steps or actions taken beyond the technology boundaries of a typical 
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ho, commercial reasonableness turned on the combination of an out-of-
band authentication procedure (the telephone confirmation) and a 
knowledge-based requirement, the security question.60 But these cases 
were of limited applicability to the situation underlying Patco because 
they addressed wire transfers initiated by fax, rather than ACH transac-
tions initiated via online banking.61 
 In 2012, however, just before the Patco case was decided, the Texas 
Court of Appeals, Texarkana did address commercial reasonableness of 
security procedures used to verify online ACH payments in All American 
Siding & Windows v. Bank of America.62 There, the security procedure 
consisted of an ID, passcode, and digital certificate verification tech-
nology.63 The court held that the security procedure was commercially 
reasonable for ACH transactions submitted via online banking because 
the bank adhered to the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council’s (“FFIEC”) 2005 guidance, a report that outlined online bank-
ing security procedure best practices.64 But the court’s focus on the 
2005 guidance seemed to reflect only the importance of considering 
adherence to industry standards when conducting the commercial rea-
sonableness analysis.65 The court did not explicitly discuss Article 4A’s 
mandate to consider the circumstances of the particular customer and 
the particular bank.66 
                                                                                                                      
transaction. Callback (voice) verification, e-mail approval or notification, and cell-phone 
based challenge/response processes are some examples.”). 
60 See Filho, 2008 WL 1752693, at *5. 
61 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between wire 
transfer and ACH payments). Compare Patco Constr. Co. v. People’s United Bank, 684 F.3d 
197, 204–05 (1st Cir. 2012) (discussing ACH fraud initiated online), with Filho, 2008 WL 
1752693, at *5 (discussing wire transfer fraud initiated by fax), and Regatos, 257 F. Supp. 2d 
at 646 (discussing wire transfer fraud initiated by fax). 
62 All Am. Siding, 367 S.W.3d at 500–01. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 500--01. The FFIEC is an interagency body tasked in part with advising federal-
ly supervised financial institutions on best practices for online banking security. About the 
FFIEC, Fed. Fin. Institutions Examination Council, http://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2013). The FFIEC recommends a multifactor authentication for high-
risk transactions like electronic funds transfers. FFIEC Guidance, supra note 59, at 6. Ac-
cording to the FFIEC, multifactor authentication should incorporate something the online 
banking user knows (such as a password), something the user has (such as an ATM card or 
secure token), and something the user is (such as a finger print scanner or voice recogni-
tion software). See id. 
65 See All Am. Siding, 367 S.W.3d at 500–01. 
66 Compare U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4 (1989) (stating that “[t]he standard is . . . whether 
the procedure is reasonable for the particular customer and the particular bank”), with All 
Am. Siding, 367 S.W.3d at 500–01 (reasoning that “the Bank followed the guidelines of the 
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B. The Commercial Reasonableness Analysis in Patco 
 In Patco, the First Circuit took a much more thorough approach to 
analyzing commercial reasonableness than its predecessors.67 The court 
considered the security procedure in totality, focusing on what was af-
firmatively included in the security procedure, what protections were 
available but not included, and what Ocean Bank knew about the risks 
of Internet-based fraud.68 
 First, the court found several problems in considering how effec-
tive Ocean Bank’s security procedure would be at preventing fraud.69 
The court noted that by reducing the dollar-amount rule threshold to 
one dollar, Ocean Bank had substantially increased the risk of fraud for 
customers who, like Patco, initiated frequent, routine transfers.70 At this 
threshold, the user would likely be prompted to answer many or all of 
his or her challenge questions before a keylogger installed on the user’s 
computer was detected and removed.71 Additionally, this rendered the 
risk score system irrelevant because a high risk score prompting a chal-
lenge question would not stop a fraudulent transaction if the fraudster 
could answer the challenge questions.72 In the court’s view, “the in-
crease in risk . . . was sufficiently serious to require a corollary increase 
in security measures,” but Ocean Bank did not make any additions to 
its security procedure.73 
                                                                                                                      
[FFIEC] and requires multifactor authentication . . . thereby demonstrating the commer-
cial reasonableness of the security procedure” (internal quotations omitted)). 
67 See Patco, 684 F.3d at 211. 
68 See id. (“We emphasize that it was these collective failures taken as a whole, rather 
than any single failure, which rendered Ocean Bank’s security system commercially unrea-
sonable.”). 
69 See id. at 210. The court focused on the security procedure as applied to Patco’s typi-
cal transactions. Id. The vast majority of Patco’s online banking transactions consisted of 
highly routine payroll transactions or associated tax payments. Id. at 200. These transac-
tions were always made on Fridays, from the same IP address and physical location at 
Patco’s Sanford offices, and they were always accompanied by weekly withdrawals for fed-
eral and state taxes. Id. The largest payroll ever run by Patco was $36,634.74. Id. By con-
trast, the smallest fraudulent transaction totaled $56,594. Id. at 204. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. 
72 Id. at 211. At the former threshold of $100,000, Patco would never have been 
prompted to input answers to its challenge questions due to the transfer amount, because 
the highest payment Patco made was $36,634.74. Id. at 211–12. Thus, the fraudsters would 
not have had the opportunity to obtain the challenge question answers with their keylog-
ger and the fraud would have been prevented. See id. According to the First Circuit, the 
risk scoring system was otherwise irrelevant because Ocean Bank employees were not mon-
itoring high-scoring transactions, and thus the system-generated risk scores contributed 
nothing to security beyond that provided by the challenge questions. Id. 
73 Patco, 684 F.3d at 212. 
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 Next, the First Circuit considered other security features available 
and in use throughout the banking industry that were not provided to 
customers at Ocean Bank.74 Here, the Court stressed that bank person-
nel were not monitoring the risk scores that NetTeller generated, 
whereas many other banks did have employees monitoring risk scores 
and verifying high-scoring transactions.75 Furthermore, the court fault-
ed the bank’s failure to employ additional, widely available physical se-
curity devices as recommended by the 2005 FFIEC guidance for online 
banking security procedures.76 
 Finally, the First Circuit considered Ocean Bank’s security proce-
dure choices in light of its substantial knowledge of ongoing fraud.77 
The FFEIC and RSA/Cyota, a security device company that worked for 
Ocean Bank’s online banking supplier, issued warnings to the banking 
industry about increased Internet fraud in 2005, four years before the 
fraud perpetrated in this case.78 The FBI issued another industry-wide 
warning in 2009, highlighting the increased use of keyloggers in online 
fraud.79 Moreover, Ocean Bank had experienced at least two incidents 
of fraud in which keyloggers may have played a role prior to the fraud 
underlying Patco.80 
 After weighing Ocean Bank’s security procedure against additional 
procedures available and in use industry-wide, and considering Ocean 
Bank’s knowledge of the threat posed by online fraud, the First Circuit 
held that, as a whole, the security procedures in place at Ocean Bank 
were not commercially reasonable.81 
III. Building on Patco, Courts Should Consider the Impact of 
Mergers When Analyzing Commercial Reasonableness 
 The First Circuit’s totality analysis laid a strong foundation for ana-
lyzing commercial reasonableness in Patco, but—where applicable— 
                                                                                                                      
74 See id. 
75 Id. 
76 See id. at 211–14. The court’s focus on the FFIEC guidance is consistent with the 
UCC’s view that “security procedures are likely to be standardized in the banking indus-
try.” See id. at 213; U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4 (1989). See generally FFIEC Guidance, supra note 
59 (discussing various security procedures available for use in online environments). 
77 Patco, 684 F.3d at 213. 
78 Id. at 211; see FFIEC Guidance, supra note 59, at 2, 7. Ocean Bank’s online banking 
vendor hired RSA/Cyota to bring NetTeller into compliance with the FFIEC guidance. See 
Patco, 684 F.3d at 202. 
79 See Patco, 684 F.3d at 206; Ludwig et al., supra note 6, at 103. 
80 See Patco, 684 F.3d at 202. 
81 Id. 
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future courts should consider more carefully the impact of mergers on 
the industry standard to which a particular bank should be held.82 The 
court’s totality test reflected Article 4A’s emphasis on balancing the par-
ticulars of each case with the baseline assumption that security proce-
dures are likely to be standardized in the banking industry.83 It carefully 
considered Patco’s typical payment history and measured the bank’s 
security procedures against a well-respected industry regulator’s rec-
ommendations.84 Additionally, the court emphasized that it was the col-
lective failure of all the affirmative security measures and omissions, 
rather than one factor in isolation, which rendered the security proce-
dures commercially unreasonable.85 
 But Article 4A also requires courts to consider “whether the pro-
cedure is reasonable for the . . . particular bank, which is a lower stand-
ard” than “whether the security procedure is the best available.”86 Un-
der Article 4A, courts must compare the bank’s security procedure to 
security procedures at other banks of similar size and situation, in part 
because larger banks in more urban environments are likely to be more 
sophisticated and have more resources available than smaller, rural, 
community banks.87 Significantly, Article 4A advocates this approach 
because the purpose of the commercial reasonableness requirement is 
to encourage banks to use efficient procedures to combat fraud, not to 
render them “insurers against fraud.”88 
 Accordingly, the First Circuit in Patco should have considered the 
impact of Ocean Bank’s recent merger because Ocean Bank was still 
functionally a rural community bank when the fraud occurred.89 Seri-
ous merger discussions often stop companies from making changes to 
their security systems, unless those changes are immediately necessary, 
                                                                                                                      
82 See Patco Constr. Co. v. People’s United Bank, 684 F.3d 197, 211 (1st Cir. 2012). 
83 See id. at 211–13; U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4 (1989) (noting that although security pro-
cedures are likely to be standardized within the banking industry, courts must evaluate 
their commercial reasonableness in light of the particular customer and particular bank 
involved in a transaction). 
84 See Patco, 684 F.3d at 211–13; U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmts. 1–7. 
85 Patco, 684 F.3d at 211. 
86 U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4 (emphasis added). 
87 See id. 
88 See id. § 4A-203 cmts. 3–4. 
89 See Patco, 684 F.3d at 213; U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4. Instead, the opinion as a whole 
suggests that the First Circuit considered Ocean Bank’s security procedures under the 
rubric of one of the premier regional banks in the Northeast. See Patco, 684 F.3d at 213; 
About People’s United, People’s United Bank, https://www.peoples.com/peoples/Footer/ 
About-People%27s-United (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). Prior to the merger with People’s 
United, Ocean Bank could best be descried as a rural community bank. See Sanders, supra 
note 31. 
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for a significant period of time before and after a deal has officially 
closed.90 Thus, it does not necessarily follow that Ocean Bank had the 
same resources or operations platforms that were available at other 
People’s United locations after being a part of People’s United for just 
five months.91 Nonetheless, the First Circuit held Ocean Bank’s security 
procedure to the industry standard for its new and more robust region-
al parent, People’s United.92 
 A better approach would have been to compare Ocean Bank with 
other Maine community banks since Ocean Bank was more closely 
analogous to that type of institution.93 As Article 4A notes, there may be 
substantial differences in what constitutes a commercially reasonable 
security procedure between a small rural bank and a larger, more so-
phisticated urban bank.94 Although the First Circuit did note that 
“many New England community banks” used secure tokens and manu-
al review of risk scores as part of their online security procedures at the 
time of the Patco fraud, even this sample is too broad.95 A cross-section 
of New England community banks includes both those located in rural 
areas like southern Maine and others in suburban Boston and Connect-
icut, whose proximity to major financial centers would likely render 
them more sophisticated than their more rural counterparts.96 
 The First Circuit’s approach likely reflects a policy choice to incen-
tivize bank compliance with industry-wide best practices for security, 
regardless of size or location.97 The comments to Article 4A suggest 
that banks are in the best position to evaluate the performance of secu-
rity procedures because they are closest to technological advancements 
in online banking security devices and the fraud necessitating their 
use.98 But banks are also concerned with the additional expense and 
                                                                                                                      
90 See generally Steven J. Pilloff, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Staff 
Study 176: Bank Merger Activity in the United States, 1994–2003 (2004), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/2000-present/ss176.pdf (documenting bank 
merger activity and its impact on the banking industry from 1994 to 2003); Stanley Foster 
Reed et al., The Art of M&A: A Merger/Acquisition/Buyout Guide (4th ed. 2007) 
(providing a step-by-step analysis of all aspects of a successful merger). Indeed, mergers have 
been a prevalent force in the banking industry in recent years. See Pilloff, supra, at 2. 
91 See Patco, 684 F.3d at 213; U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4; Reed, supra note 90, at 643–83; 
Sanders, supra note 31. 
92 See Patco, 684 F.3d at 211–14. 
93 Id. at 213; U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4. 
94 U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4. 
95 See Patco, 684 F.3d at 213. 
96 See U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4. 
97 See Patco, 684 F.3d at 211; U.C.C. § 4A-102 cmt.; id. § 4A-203 cmt. 3. 
98 U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 3. 
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operational challenges presented by implementing new technology to 
combat fraud.99 In contrast, regulatory agencies like the FFIEC are also 
close to these developments, but because these agencies focus on fraud 
prevention instead of profit, they are better equipped to view security 
innovations objectively and make balanced recommendations about 
their use.100 Thus, resolving these types of factual considerations in fa-
vor of the customers incentivizes banks to either proactively comply 
with industry-wide best practices despite their initial costs or to insure 
themselves against losses resulting from fraudulent transactions.101 
 In the future, to avoid liability for fraud, banks of any size should 
implement security procedures that are in line with the 2005 FFIEC 
guidance whenever possible.102 At a minimum, banks should ensure 
that their security procedures include some form of multifactor au-
thentication because multifactor authentication has been strongly pre-
dictive of commercial reasonableness.103 
                                                                                                                      
99 See id. 
100 See U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 3; FFIEC Guidance, supra note 59, at 1. 
101 FFIEC Guidance, supra note 59, at 2–6 (discussing recommendations for financial 
institutions to safeguard their accounts against Internet-based fraud); see U.C.C. § 4A-102 
cmt. (noting that the ability to plan for and insure against risk are fundamental motiva-
tions behind Article 4A generally). But see U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 4 (cautioning against ren-
dering banks “insurers against fraud”). 
102 See Patco, 684 F.3d at 201–04. The First Circuit’s emphasis on comparing Ocean 
Bank’s security procedures to those in the FFIEC guidance pursuant to Article 4A’s man-
date to consider “security procedures in general use by customers and receiving banks 
similarly situated” implicitly endorses the FFIEC guidelines as a shorthand benchmark for 
general industry standards. U.C.C. § 4A-202(c); see Patco, 684 F.3d at 201; see also All Am. 
Siding & Windows, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 367 S.W.3d 490, 501 (Tex. App. 2012) (hold-
ing that security procedures that complied with the 2005 FFIEC guidance were commer-
cially reasonable). The FFIEC guidance notes that security procedures for funds transfer 
systems should incorporate three levels of multifactor authentication. See FFIEC Guid-
ance, supra note 59, at 3–4. Even Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, the 2003 case from the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, which was decided before the FFIEC 
guidelines were promulgated, implicitly endorsed multifactor authentication procedures. 
See Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, 257 F. Supp. 2d 632, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
103 See Patco, 684 F.3d 201–04 (noting that there was no multifactor authentication where 
lack of monitoring rendered the digital certificate ineffective against fraud); Filho v. In-
teraudi Bank, No. 03 Civ. 4795(SAS), 2008 WL 1752693, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that 
voice recognition and signature confirmation constituted multifactor authentication); Rega-
tos, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 646 (holding that out-of-band confirmation consisting of logged tele-
phone confirmation from client on recorded line constituted multifactor authentication); All 
Am. Siding, 367 S.W.3d at 501 (holding that a bank demonstrated the commercial reasona-
bleness of its security procedures by following the FFIEC guidance and “requir[ing] multifac-
tor authentication for its online banking customers” (internal quotations omitted)); see also 
supra note 66 (discussing the multifactor authentication promoted by the FFIEC guidance). 
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Conclusion 
 Only recently have courts begun to examine the commercial rea-
sonableness of security procedures under Article 4A. Indeed, Patco was 
only the fourth case, and the first at the circuit level, to consider this 
issue. As Internet-based fraud becomes increasingly common, courts 
will have ample opportunity to define and shape the contours of com-
mercial reasonableness under Article 4A. To that end, the First Circuit 
has provided a strong foundation on which future courts can develop a 
more precise and balanced rubric for commercial reasonableness of 
security procedures. Building on Patco, future courts should closely 
consider each bank’s circumstances when choosing an industry stand-
ard against which to gauge the bank’s security procedures, especially 
when the bank recently has been involved in a merger. 
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